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Abstract 
The security and safety of urban mass transit systems continues to draw a great 
deal of government, media and public attention. The bombings in Madrid, 
London and Mumbai, suggest that new and “acceptable” approaches to counter-
terrorism may become important components of how urban mass transit systems 
are designed and operated in the future. Technical developments in security and 
counter-terrorism can provide a wide range of non-intrusive or overt design 
solutions to counter-terrorism. However, in implementing these design solutions 
the whole system performance needs to be considered. Undertaking qualitaitv e 
research with a wide range of stakeholders (including the public, transit system 
designers and operators) the potential acceptability of certain technological 
approaches is assessed. Analysis of the findings suggests five broad acceptability 
factors governed by five influence variables. The acceptability factors include 
that counter-terrorism measures are more acceptable to transit designers and 
operators if they are tied in with complementary personal security and safety 
features, and are more acceptable to transit operators and the general public if 
they do not restrict the free flow of passengers through the transit network. These 
perspectives are dependent upon influence variables including whether there was 
a recent attack on a UK transit system and the Government's present 'level of 
threat' from terrorist attack.  The impact of these findings is discussed along with 
suggestions for future research into acceptable counter-terrorism measures for 
transport. 
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1 Introduction – Acceptability of Counter Terrorism 
Measures 
Urban Mass Transportation systems (UMT) are vital to meet society’s 
demands for rapid transport of people into and out of cities.  The recognised 
objective of many known terrorist organisations is to carry out disruptive acts 
and in so doing cripple the economy of the respective service, community or 
nation. These acts include the usage of explosives to cause damage and infuse 
terror among the public.  Many industries become victim to these acts and suffer 
a full range of losses owing to damage, uncertainty and fear.  Across Europe 
millions of people travel daily on UMT systems, and by design, such systems 
must be open and accessible, which has the confounding factor of making them 
difficult to secure.  As such rail transit is considered an attractive target, 
highlighting the importance of rail security for staff and passengers alike [10]. 
 
Over recent years terrorists have demonstrated the ability to change strategies 
and tactics in response to security measures. As a result, transport officials and 
policy makers need to adapt in order to protect the public.  However 
“acceptability” is an important concept in the implementation of changes to a 
system.  Different stakeholders will have a range of views and perceptions as to 
what is acceptable, depending on their role (for example manager, security 
personnel, passenger or otherwise) and their personal judgements. These can all 
change over time, in response to particular events and different countries may 
have differing standards as to what is acceptable.  In addition, acceptability is 
just one factor in the adoption of Counter-Terrorism (CT) measures, and hence 
must be considered alongside other factors such as cost and performance in the 
context of the integrated system. 
 
The literature and research reported in this paper aims to introduce the counter-
terrorism acceptability issue in respect of urban mass transit and light rail 
systems.  Using a combination of data from focus groups, case studies and semi-
structured interviews a broad picture is painted of the issues relevant to 
stakeholders which will provide the basis of further empirical works. It is worth 
noting that the focus of the research is on vehicles and stations as ‘crowded 
places’, rather than on infrastructure such as depots, power supplies and remote 
installations.  
2 The Emerging Debate - Terrorist Threats and Public 
Perceptions 
The issue of terrorist threat to rail systems is real, current and pervasive, but 
attacks against railways date back to the first rail system in the 19th century.  In 
recent years an increasing number of high profile incidents emphasise the 
importance in raising awareness of the issues involved.  
 
2.1 A Provenance of Rail Terror Attacks  
A statistical summary compiled from the US Government Global Terrorism 
Database [9] shows that bombings are by far the most common type of attack 
against rail systems, accounting for almost 90% of all incidents. The most 
common targets are ‘crowded places’ such as stations and passenger trains with 
only 7% of attacks directed against infrastructure.  
 
The majority of documented attacks however are relatively small in scale.   
Typical of these are the PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army) campaign on 
mainland Britain during the 1990s. The most serious incidents were at London’s 
Victoria Station on 18th February 1991, where one person was killed and 38 
injured by a bomb planted in a litter bin, and at London Bridge station on 28th 
February 1992 where 29 people were injured [2].   During this period there were 
41 actual bombs compared with over 6700 bomb threats made against the 
railways; additionally there were over 9500 suspicious items left on the railway 
system that required the attention of the UK police [5].  In this case, the aim of 
the campaign was primarily to cause disruption rather than casualties. 
 
More recently there has been a shift from smaller scale attacks intending to cause 
only disruption (such as the PIRA campaign) towards mass casualty events, as 
well as the emergence of suicide bombers. This represents ‘a different brand of 
terrorism’ [10] with coordinated attacks on a much larger scale than previously 
experienced and on multiple targets. Importantly, avoidance of capture is often 
of little concern in these attacks, which are conducted by determined individuals 
after meticulously planning  
 
The bombings of commuter trains in Madrid on 11th March 2004 (killing 191 
people and injuring 1841 [3]) and the suicide bombers in London on 7th July 
2005 (52 deaths and over 770 injuries [4]) are recent examples of rail attack 
strategies.  The sarin gas attack on the Tokyo Subway on 20th March 1995 was 
proclaimed the dawn of a new age of ‘catastrophic’ terrorism involving 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons’ [1]. In all, 12 people were killed, and 
over 5000 injured with varying degrees of severity [2], although the 
psychological effects and uncertainty surrounding an attack with an 
unconventional weapon are harder to quantify.   With few exceptions these 
attacks have involved major injuries and casualties to the public, and in light of 
these trends, crowded places should continue to be seen as priority cases for the 
introduction of counter-terrorist measures. 
 
2.2 Reaction Priorities in light of the Changing Nature of Terror Objectives   
Just as terrorist tactics have changed, the response to terrorist attacks has also 
changed, now focussing on fast recovery of the system rather than merely the 
development of measures to reduce vulnerability to attack. This highlights an 
important distinction in CT measures, between an ‘active’ and ‘passive’ 
approach [11]. Active measures require sustained input from the system 
operators (with consequent costs), for example the provision of security staff and 
the associated resources required (equipment, communications, control rooms 
and so forth). Passive measures are generally environmental features that are 
either designed-in or retro-fitted, that require no further input; for example 
materials choices, or layout and structure of buildings, vehicles or infrastructure. 
Historically, CT strategies have been focussed on active measures against the 
terrorist threat, such as policing; these are now well developed after experience 
with the PIRA campaign [12]. There is now more potential for development of 
passive measures, i.e. designing the system in a particular way to make an attack 
more difficult, minimise damage from an attack and recover quickly (and also to 
make the active measures in place more effective). This has been termed 
‘designing-in resilience’; to help prevent, protect and prepare systems against 
terrorist attack [28]. 
2.3 Business case for Counter-Terrorism Measures 
Notwithstanding the events highlighted above, terrorist attacks are of relative 
low frequency; therefore it can be difficult to build a business case for adoption 
of CT measures. The resources for CT are limited and are in competition with 
other issues within the rail system as a whole (for example for funds) [10]. 
Therefore, decisions about spending should be based on a sound assessment of 
the risks to the system, and effectiveness of proposed measures in mitigating 
these risks [6]. 
 
One concept to consider here is ‘dual-use’, where CT measures have other 
benefits to the system too [7]; for example increased policing in response to a 
terrorist threat can also help decrease crime, or a choice of bomb-resistant 
materials can also improved fire safety. However, there are vast arrays of threats 
and hazards that may conflict with CT measures and so the impact of all 
potential measures should be analysed [8]. 
2.4  Acceptability of Counter-Terrorism Measures 
Acceptability is highly a subjective concept and hence cannot easily be 
quantified in scientific terms.   In the macro-analysis CT can only be considered 
alongside other prevalent issues. In a publicly utilised and functional space an 
overarching concern would be service efficiency.  The introduction of 
continuingly changing CT features (in light of new threats), raises the utilitarian 
concerns of practicality, aesthetics, efficiency, impact on the travelling public, 
ultimate cost and other such factors. This raises the argument of what is and what 
is not acceptable for the different parties involved.    
 
It is an overriding expectation that UMT systems should be well organised 
and maintained and that this extends to the organisation and operation of 
security measures and features. However, increasingly across nations the 
UMT systems are owned and managed by a number of competing 
commercial operators with varying management systems. In such an 
environment, market forces apply, resulting in operators pursuing their own 
goals, possibly at the expense of public requirements [23]. Consequently, 
enthusiastic rhetoric is not always matched by firm action due to the often costly 
implications of CT measures. An acceptable balance must be struck between 
level of risk to a system and the mitigation response; investigating the potential 
acceptability of certain technological approaches is a key component of 
understanding this balance.   
3 Methodology 
The data reported in this paper forms the initial part of a multiphase research 
project.  The scoping study employed four particular approaches to determine the 
state of CT on urban mass transit systems; these included a literature review, 
workshops, semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Data gathering was 
deliberate and extensive across the UK and Europe, ensuring that a variety of 
perspectives were included.   
 
Within research it is often considered necessary to conduct scoping studies to 
assess the relevance and size of the literature and to delimit the subject area or 
topic [26]. Such studies need to consider cross-disciplinary perspectives and 
alternative ways in which a research topic has previously been tackled. In much 
qualitative research the analytical process begins during data collection as the 
data already gathered are analysed and shape the ongoing data collection This 
sequential analysis [24] or interim analysis [2] has the advantage of allowing the 
researcher to go back and refine questions, develop hypotheses, and pursue 
emerging avenues of inquiry in further depth.  The choice of a mixed-mode 
approach was made: 1) to compensate for the complexity of the subject matter; 
and 2) formed a convenient tool to gather concise and acceptable data from 
multiple sources.  The data presented below is a consolidation of data collected 
from sixty five key stakeholders from transport, police, built environment and 
CT practitioners.  
 
4 Results and Discussion  
The study participants were formed from convenience samples across thirty 
interviews, three focus groups and two workshops (use of more rigorously 
selected samples may be pursued in later work). In each case, the brief synopsis 
of counter terrorism methods and initiatives offered by Table 1 was used as a 
basis for discussion, and was itself further developed during the discussions. 
 
The data from interviews, focus groups and workshops was content analysed for 
emergent themes driving the decisions made by the various stakeholders. As the 
complexity of issues surrounding counter-terrorism grows (for example, with the 
potential for a legal requirement to consider CT in system design and operation) 
the need grows for a rational decision-making model, system or framework to 
assist transport operators. The perspective from which the analysis presented 
here was conducted was therefore to identify themes useful in developing 
support for those who must make decisions about counter-terrorism in a rail 
transport context. The results illustrate the acceptability issues for counter-
terrorism measures in light rail systems for  both staff and owners/operators of 
the system, as well as the general public.  
 
Table1.  Counter-Terrorism Methods and initiatives 
 
CT 
Methods Calibrated Responses 
Baggage 
Screening 
This has been trialled on the railway network. However, the 
sheer number of people using rail transport every day means that 
screening every passenger is not realistic or possible without 
drastically changing passenger experience 
Armed 
Security 
While the presence of security staff is generally welcomed, 
deploying heavily armed soldiers  has led to public resistance, as 
it can contribute to an atmosphere of fear. Use has therefore 
provoked some controversy. 
Advanced 
Security 
Highly visible (or even oppressive) counter-terrorism security 
measures might increase security, but can also promote a climate 
of fear among passengers, as with some of the reactions to the 
‘ring of steel’ in the City of London in response to PIRA 
bombings 
Blast 
proofing 
The use of blast resistant materials is welcomed although 
requires consideration of the cost implications, impact on vehicle 
weight and many other factors 
Sensory 
Devices 
Sensory devices may be welcomed if proven to be efficient (no 
false alarms), effective (fit for purpose) and unobtrusive.  The 
cost implications are hard to assess for CNBR equipment as 
there have so far been no attacks of this type on UK systems 
Litter Bins Explosive devices may be hidden in litter receptacles so design 
of these from a counter-terrorism perspective was welcome. In 
most cases the removal of litter bins would unduly 
inconvenience passengers, hence is unacceptable 
CCTV Continuous surveillance of public places is generally considered 
acceptable. However, there is resistance to widespread coverage 
of such systems, on the grounds that constant surveillance erodes 
civil liberties 
 
4.1 Acceptability Factors and Influence Variables 
Analysis of the discussions during the interviewees and focus groups has 
highlighted five broad acceptability factors as determined by five influence 
variables.  Acceptability factors stipulate that counter-terrorism features are: 
 
a) more acceptable to transit designers and operators if they are tied in with 
complementary non-terrorism related personal security and safety features; 
b) acceptable to transit operators and the general public if they do not restrict 
the free flow of passengers through the transit network (e.g. not based on 
airport style security barriers);   
c) more acceptable if the measures are non-intrusive and do not unduly portray 
an image of a system ‘under attack’; 
d) more acceptable to service operators if the providers themselves may be held 
accountable for lapses in security; and 
e) more acceptable where benefits are perceived to outweigh the cost of 
implementation. 
The influence variables determine that decisions to integrate counter-terrorism 
measures are dependent on: 
 
1) whether there was a recent attack on a UK transit system; 
2) the Government's present 'level of threat' from terrorist attack; 
3) media coverage of global terrorism issues;  
4) when security precautions were last updated; and 
5) influence of relevant stakeholder group (relative 
power/authority/engagement of the individual or organisation). 
 
4.2 Directions of future research 
In addition to informing the development of a decision support framework for 
those who must implement CT measures, the acceptability and influence results 
can be used to highlight the future directions for more technical research. Recent 
acts of terror have increased the interest in understanding a range of extreme 
events and planning for their occurrence, for example flooding and other natural 
phenomena as well as terrorism [29].  Against this background, designing-in 
resilience to attack is one area where there is significant scope for development. 
For example this may be through choice of construction materials, layout, 
structure and through ‘passive’ technologies which can cost effectively be 
designed-in to rail vehicles and infrastructure. Other areas of potential further 
research include scanning and detection technology, a greater understanding of 
possible CBRN attacks and in-transit security of hazardous goods, intelligent 
CCTV monitoring, crowd dynamics, behavioural analysis and other 
psychological issues.  A factor not highlighted above, but which was raised by 
several respondents, is that transport systems, their stations, critical infrastructure 
and vehicles are often privately owned, and effective protection against all forms 
of hazard, including terrorism, depends on an effective partnership between 
business community and government [30].  Research into effective 
implementation of technological solutions is therefore also of importance in this 
complex environment. 
 
5 Conclusions and Directions for Further Research 
This study is the result of discussions with 65 stakeholders in the rail and urban 
rapid transit field.  Data was gathered through thirty interviews, three focus 
groups and two workshops.  From the data the acceptability of certain 
technological approaches to counter-terrorism for urban rail systems was 
assessed.  A brief summary of current counter terrorism methods and initiatives 
for rail systems was used as a basis for the interviews, and was itself further 
developed during the discussions. 
 
The analysis of responses showed that implementation of counter-terrorism 
measures relies on five broad acceptability factors which in turn are dependent 
upon five influence variables.  Due to the exploratory nature of the research and 
it’s relatively wide scope the results can be taken as a general analysis of the 
issues involved.  However the overall picture that emerges is a reflection of the 
contexts in which decisions are made, but also indicates a low level of 
preparedness for terrorist attack.  The results highlight a relative lack of 
confidence and the limited plans that exist to deal with threats to systems. 
Furthermore, the limited measures that have been put in place to deal with this 
threat are largely reactive in nature.  The findings suggest that future research on 
implementation of CT for transport systems must seek unobtrusive, low cost 
solutions, ideally with ‘dual benefits’ in areas such as personal security, or the 
performance of the system in other extreme conditions such as natural disasters. 
Continued research in this area will serve to give transport operators a guide to 
help evaluate their systems and determine the best, and most efficient, ways to 
improve counter terrorism security. 
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